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Abstract—Increasingly autonomous cyber-physical systems based 
on self-adaptive software are making their way into the aviation 
domain. However, the combination of their adaptive learning 
properties and the safety goals of aviation create unique legal and 
regulatory challenges for the manufacturers and regulators of 
such systems alike. This paper argues that some of the 
fundamental concepts of the product liability regime in the EU 
and their interpretation deprive manufacturers of autonomous 
systems of two essential defences: the ‘state of the art’ defence 
and the regulatory compliance defence. The hesitation in the 
direction of the overall approach to regulating and certifying 
autonomous systems in aviation induces legal uncertainty which 
can only be overcome through surgical legislative intervention. 
The paper formulates recommendations for amendments in light 
of the ongoing evaluation and pending review of the Product 
Liability Directive. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Software plays a critical role in commercial aviation. 
Navigation, aircraft control and other functions of flight 
management systems are now largely automated by software. 
With pilots’ role becoming mainly supervisory in nature, the 
trend over the last few decades has been clearly one of steady 
growth of automation. While automation has undoubtedly 
improved aviation safety, it has also been a contributing factor 
to several fatal incidents [1]. 
The continuous increase in air traffic has called for 
transformation of the aviation industry. The disruptive power 
of new technologies, such as increasingly autonomous cyber-
physical systems and machine learning, promises to improve 
the capacity and profitability of air services and contribute to 
improving safety, security, environmental protection and 
infrastructure modernisation [2]. However, the “coupling” of 
cyberspace with the physical world gives rise to significant 
challenges in terms of reconciling the distinct features of the 
two environments. Cyberspace, an ideal environment governed 
by the rules of software code, is opposed to the physical 
environment of aviation governed by the laws of physics, linear 
time and stringent safety rules. Connected aircraft and digital 
air traffic management (ATM) systems are just beginning to 
leverage the benefits of this cyber layer. At the same time, 
increasingly autonomous systems, such as unmanned aircraft 
systems, relying on self-adaptive software and machine 
learning, promise cost savings and facilitate new opportunities 
for air carriers [3], [4]. 
Against the background of fast-paced developments and 
growing complexity of software-intensive aviation socio-
technical systems [5], regulators and legislators are facing the 
challenges of the growing divide between technology and 
regulation. The conservative nature of aviation safety 
regulation is now confronted with the influx of a wide range of 
commercial off-the-shelf technologies which cannot be 
certified using the safety standards for aircraft and ATM 
systems. Furthermore, existing certification and standardisation 
processes are based on the assumption that a system’s correct 
behaviour “must be completely specified and verified prior to 
operation” [6]. This constitutes a significant barrier to the 
development of new autonomous systems relying on adaptive 
software and machine learning algorithms as they are 
intrinsically self-directed and non-deterministic. 
Certification and standardisation also provide the 
manufacturers of such systems with a certain level of assurance 
regarding the compliance of their products. More specifically, 
under product liability law, manufacturers can be held liable 
for damages to third parties caused by defective products. Until 
recently, manufacturers’ liability in the aviation industry was 
considered more the subject of academic debate rather than a 
practical issue. However, in 2015, the Spanish Supreme Court 
held liable the manufacturers for product defects of the 
collision avoidance system (TCAS) installed on board the 
aircraft involved in the Überlingen mid-air collision accident 
[7]. A significant precedent “reaffirm[ing] product liability in 
the aviation domain”, this decision also demonstrates the 
difficulties in allocating liabilities in socio-technical systems 
and the role of certification as a determining factor [8]. 
At EU level, Directive 85/374/EEC on liability for 
defective products (“Product Liability Directive”) establishes a 
harmonised strict liability regime which holds the producer 
liable for damage caused by a defect in their product. The 
applicability of this directive in the realm of aviation was 
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recognised from the very beginning [9]. The general rule is 
qualified by six exceptions, two of which are particularly 
important for manufacturers of autonomous systems in 
aviation. According to Article 7 (d) and (e), a manufacturer 
may escape liability if they prove that:  
 the defect is due to compliance of the product with 
mandatory regulations issued by the public 
authorities (known as ‘regulatory compliance 
defence’); or  
 the state of scientific and technical knowledge at 
the time when they put the product into circulation 
was not such as to enable the existence of the 
defect to be discovered (known as ‘development 
risk’ or ‘state of the art defence’). 
This paper argues that these two exceptions can hardly be 
invoked by manufacturers in the context of increasingly 
autonomous systems which in turn induces legal uncertainty. 
More specifically, for manufacturers of hardware and software 
for the nascent market of commercial unmanned aircraft 
systems in the EU this might act as a barrier stifling innovation. 
In light of the ongoing evaluation of the directive, the paper 
briefly discusses several possible solutions. 
The paper is organised as follows: 
 section II provides an overview of the specific 
legal and regulatory challenges of increasingly 
autonomous adaptive systems; 
 section III discusses the central notion of ‘defect’ 
and the applicability of the notion of ‘state of the 
art’ to increasingly autonomous adaptive systems. 
 section IV focuses on the difficulties in the 
certification of increasingly autonomous adaptive 
systems and their impact on the exercising of the 
regulatory compliance defence; 
 section V outlines the impact of these challenges 
on the developing European market for unmanned 
aircraft systems; 
 section VI looks at the possible solutions to 
mitigate the legal uncertainty and create enabling 
conditions for the development of autonomous 
systems in aviation. 
II. AUTOMATION AND AUTONOMY 
The terms automation and autonomy are often confused 
and even used interchangeably. However, while automated 
technologies have been used in aviation for quite some time 
now, this is not the case for autonomous technologies. 
Automation refers to a system performing its function with 
little or no human involvement where the system’s 
performance is limited to its predefined tasks. Unlike 
automation, autonomy refers to systems which exhibit self-
directed behaviour and can dynamically respond and adapt to 
events which have not been pre-programmed [6]. 
As future cyber-physical systems in aviation will 
increasingly rely on autonomous technologies, this will put to 
the test some established regulatory conventions. From a legal 
and regulatory perspective, at least two groups of challenges 
draw attention. 
The first challenge is linked to the basic question of when a 
product is defective, and whether autonomous systems’ 
learning and adaptive capabilities render the safety 
expectations test and the manufacturer’s state of the art defence 
unfit. These problems will be discussed in section III. 
The second challenge is related to how certification 
authorities verify and certify autonomous systems, given 
predictability and certainty are at the core of the current 
certification process. Authorities would have to assure the new 
systems are at least as safe as the existing ones. The US Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) and the European Aviation 
Safety Agency (EASA) can certainly rely on the ‘special 
conditions’ for such ‘non-conventional aircraft’, as established 
in FAR 21, Paragraph 16 and EASA Part 21, Paragraph 
21.A.16B, to add safety standards ensuring equivalent level of 
safety to the one in the airworthiness regulations/certification 
standards [10]. However, this does not resolve the issue of how 
acceptability and practicability would be balanced to establish 
a sufficient level of safety of autonomous systems. The 
uncertain context and independence of autonomous systems 
could render existing performance standards inapplicable to 
them. While some solutions to this problem have already been 
proposed, their impact on producers’ liability will be discussed 
in section IV. 
III. DEFECTS: BETWEEN CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS AND 
THE STATE OF THE ART 
Under the Product Liability Directive, an injured party can 
assert a claim against a producer on three conditions: there 
must be a defect, a damage and a causal relationship between 
the two. 
Article 6 of the Product Liability Directive provides that a 
product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a 
person is entitled to expect. It is beyond any doubt that the 
reasonable safety expectations for an aviation product will be 
very different from, for example, those for a smartwatch. 
Furthermore, it should be understood that ‘products’ here in the 
context of autonomous systems in aviation may include 
hardware components as well as software applications etc. 
Thus, the preliminary question of whether an autonomous 
system is a ‘product’ in the first place must be answered. 
The Product Liability Directive defines in Article 2 
products as all ‘movables’, even when incorporated in 
immovables. Considering the software-intensive nature of 
autonomous systems in aviation, it is reasonable to ask if 
software fits within this definition. The European 
Commission’s view is that the directive “applies to software in 
the same way [as to other movables], moreover, that it applies 
to handicraft and artistic products” [11]. However, it is 
uncertain whether the directive applies solely to embedded 
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software and software available on tangible medium or also to 
“software as a service” [12]. Legal uncertainty remains high, 
however, given that to date there has been no case law on 
whether the Product Liability Directive applies to software, a 
point also acknowledged by the Commission itself [13]. In any 
case, as most autonomous aviation systems are likely to be 
cyber-physical systems operating embedded software, they 
should fall within the ambit of the definition of a ‘product’. 
It was mentioned that for a product to be defective, it must 
fail to meet a person’s safety expectations. Thus, the notion of 
‘defect’ in EU product liability law is not grounded in technical 
defects but rather in the general public’s expectations of the 
required degree of safety. In the recent Boston Scientific case, 
the Court of Justice of the EU (“CJEU”) held that “[t]he safety 
which the public at large is entitled to expect (…) must 
therefore be assessed by taking into account, inter alia, the 
intended purpose, the objective characteristics and properties of 
the product in question and the specific requirements of the 
group of users for whom the product is intended” [14]. In his 
Opinion, the Advocate General (“AG”) Bot suggested that a 
product defect “can exist irrespective of any internal fault in 
the product concerned” and that the “triggering factor does not 
reside in the product fault, but in the fact that the product does 
not provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect” 
[15]. This implies that a product which is technically sound 
may still be defective if it fails to meet the expectations in 
terms of safety. 
Concurring with the AG Opinion, the court went further 
and found that even the potential lack of safety may give rise to 
producer’s liability which, in the case’s context of medical 
devices, stems from “the abnormal potential for damage which 
those products might cause to the person concerned” (§ 40). 
Thus, the court ruled that “where it is found that such products 
belonging to the same group or forming part of the same 
production series have a potential defect, it is possible to 
classify as defective all the products in that group or series, 
without there being any need to show that the product in 
question is defective” (§ 41). While the court did not go as far 
as AG Bot to highlight the “preventive function” assigned to 
product liability law (§ 38) [15], it grounded its findings in 
teleological interpretation of the directive’s objective of fair 
risk apportionment and the high priority of consumer 
protection (§ 42, 47). 
The decision has been criticised for its “counter-productive 
effects” in creating liability for potentially defective products 
and effectively rewriting the directive [16]. Despite some 
commentators’ opinion that the case has implications only for 
the medical devices industry, the broad policy objectives upon 
which the decision is based and the court’s use of broad 
language suggest otherwise [17]. Furthermore, provided the 
safety requirements for aviation systems are very high, an 
analogy to the “abnormal potential for damage” stemming from 
defects in such products may not be that far-fetched. 
The criterion of ‘safety expectations’ merits special 
attention in the context of autonomous aviation systems. 
Autonomous systems are inherently self-adaptive; they control 
their behaviour in accordance with “context-relevant norms, 
constraints, or desiderata” [18]. Their objective characteristics 
come into conflict with the concept of ‘safety expectations’ 
which is based, inter alia, on the expectations at the time when 
the product was put into circulation and which cannot go 
beyond that point in time on grounds of subsequent better 
products (Article 6(1)(b) in relation to Article 6 (2) Product 
Liability Directive). Thus, it is not clear whether, for the 
purpose of assessing these expectations, the alteration of an 
autonomous system’s behaviour or an update/upgrade of its 
functionality could be considered a defective product if it fails 
to meet the safety expectations or as a new product that does 
not affect them. In addition, the public’s safety expectations are 
also determined by the presentation of the product (Article 
6(1)(a) Product Liability Directive) which means that as well as 
generally known risks, any risks of which the public has been 
specifically informed by the manufacturer are also relevant. As 
a matter of fact, in the case of Boston Scientific, the claims 
were based precisely on alerts made by the manufacturer. 
Given the broad interpretation of potential defects and the 
likelihood of claims being asserted on the basis of a mere 
notice, manufacturers are likely to become discouraged to 
share information with the public where the risk is perceived to 
be considerably small [16]. This is even more so when it comes 
to autonomous systems in aviation where the very behaviour of 
the system coupled with the high safety expectations in the 
sector may lead to it being considered a product of “abnormal 
potential for damage”. 
The liability for potential defects established in Boston 
Scientific raises troubling concerns as it cannot be easily 
reconciled with the adaptive behaviour of autonomous systems. 
For example, two autonomous systems may operate in two 
different contexts changing their behaviour according to 
different conditions and constraints. If one of them changes its 
behaviour in a way that does not meet the public’s safety 
expectations and causes damages, the potential defect liability 
doctrine would likely automatically render any other instance 
of the same system operating in a different context defective as 
well. As a result, this opens the door to an unlimited chain of 
claims against the manufacturer based on the potential lack of 
safety of the autonomous system. 
Another interesting point could be made with respect to the 
public’s safety expectations for software-intensive systems in 
general. It is well-known in the software industry that 
commercial software is often shipped with flaws and defects 
and this more or less has been accepted by the public when it 
comes to standard software packages, such as word processors 
[19]. In the aviation domain, however, the software assurance 
process is much more thorough so that it can ensure the 
product is developed in line with very specific requirements 
and it does not exhibit any unintended behaviour [6]. 
Nevertheless, cases such as the Spanish case against the 
manufacturers of the TCAS involved in the Überlingen 
accident show that even this software can fail. A reasonable 
question, then, is how the presence of ‘bugs’, as inherent and 
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unavoidable ‘features’ of present-day software, impacts the 
public’s safety expectations. In the English case of A and 
Others v National Blood Authority and another, the court 
referred to an exchange between Mrs Flesch MEP and the 
European Commission in June 1980, Viscount Davignon, on 
behalf of the Commission, stated that “nobody can expect from 
a product a degree of safety from risks which are, because of its 
particular nature, inherent in that product and generally known, 
e.g., the risk of damage to health caused by alcoholic 
beverages. Such a product is not defective within the meaning 
of . . . the . . . Directive” [20], [16]. It is interesting to see if 
manufacturers would employ a similar reasoning to argue that 
the fact software is never flawless effectively lowers the 
public’s safety expectations. Furthermore, a related question 
concerns the extent to which software’s inherent flaws impact 
producers’ liability for potential defects. 
The liability for potential defects in Boston Scientific 
operationalises the risk of malfunction to become a defect in 
the future and not the occurrence of an actual defect [16]. This 
distinction is critical for manufacturers as it determines 
whether they may invoke the state of art defence under Article 
7 (e) Product Liability Directive. As the public cannot have 
legitimate expectations of 100% safety, this simply means that 
if the risk of a product malfunctioning in the future reveals an 
“abnormal potential for damage”, without any specific 
indications of current or imminent malfunctioning, the 
manufacturer may not be able to rely on the state of the art 
defence. 
As construed by the CJEU, the defence refers to the 
“objective state of scientific and technical knowledge of which 
the producer is presumed to have been informed” to the extent 
that this knowledge is “accessible at the time when the product 
in question was put into circulation” [21]. This means the state 
of the art must be objectively examined through the lens of the 
most advanced level of knowledge, regardless of the industrial 
sector concerned (§ 26). Thus, for a manufacturer to exonerate 
themselves from liability for potential defects, they must prove 
that they could not have known about the risk of product 
malfunctioning in the future, even with the most advanced 
level of scientific and technical knowledge. 
Such an interpretation implies a very high standard for 
exoneration which is likely to leave manufacturers with no 
effective defence for the development risks they undertake. 
This is especially so in the case of autonomous aviation 
systems, where the learning and adaptation feedback loops may 
lead to changes in a system’s behaviour that creates new risks 
that could have been neither known nor foreseen. The problem 
is further exacerbated by the interaction and exchange of data 
between autonomous systems which give rise to new and more 
complex safety risks. Without an objective standard for what 
an “abnormal potential for damage” constitutes, especially in 
the case of autonomous systems, the state of the art defence 
could easily become a thing of the past. 
The state of the art is a moving target. In principle, this 
should mean that for the new risks emerging with the 
technology’s continuous development, manufacturers should 
be covered by the state of the art defence. The far-reaching 
implications of Boston Scientific, however, suggest that the 
product liability regime in the EU has a “preventive and 
prophylactic function that goes beyond merely reacting to 
damage materialization” [17]. While it is true that the court 
explicitly says that the products “may be”, and not “must be”, 
considered defective [16], the very possibility that a national 
court may concur with this reasoning produces legal 
uncertainty. Consequently, the product liability’s deterrence 
function may equally end up deterring innovation if applied 
broadly and indiscriminately. 
IV. CERTIFYING AUTONOMY: BETWEEN PRODUCERS’ 
COMPLIANCE AND STANDARD-SETTERS’ LIABILITY 
Standardisation and certification are essential for safety in 
aviation. It was already mentioned that the current certification 
standards are rooted in determinism and predictability which 
means that the correct behaviour of a system must be 
completely specified and verified prior to operation. However, 
regulatory authorities are now facing the challenges of 
introducing commonplace cyber technologies in aviation. This 
trend not only furthers the state of the art but also renders this 
traditional mindset largely inapplicable to autonomous systems 
based on adaptive software and machine learning algorithms, 
such as the ‘sense and avoid’ algorithms in unmanned aircraft 
systems. 
The need of a new approach to the certification, verification 
and validation of increasingly autonomous systems in aviation 
has long been recognised as a critical bottleneck [3]. And while 
a good amount of research on the certification challenges is 
already underway, the implications of these challenges for the 
manufacturers’ liability for defective products has remained 
largely unexplored. 
The link between certification and liability is evident from 
Article 7(d) Product Liability Directive which establishes the 
so-called ‘regulatory compliance defence’. A manufacturer can 
invoke this defence to exonerate themselves from liability if 
they prove that the defect is “due to compliance of the product 
with mandatory regulations issued by the public authorities” 
(emphasis added). Thus, if a manufacturer proves that the 
defect in their product is the result of their compliance with a 
mandatory (ie, binding) norm adopted by an authority with 
regulatory powers, they shall not be liable. 
It is generally accepted that this defence has a rather narrow 
scope and can rarely be invoked successfully [22]. This is so 
because, first, in most cases legislation establishes minimum 
standards which provide manufacturers with a wide margin of 
appreciation and, second, the defect itself must be the result of 
compliance with the mandatory rule which would rarely be the 
case. 
In a comparative perspective, the regulatory compliance 
defence in most European countries is of rather limited 
application. 
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First, the scope of the term “mandatory regulation” is 
construed restrictively. For example, in France, Spain, Austria, 
Germany and the UK compliance with norms establishing 
minimum legal or regulatory requirements, voluntary 
standards, private norms and technical standards issued by 
national or international standardisation organisations are 
excluded from the scope of the defence. Standards, however, 
may have a role in determining the public’s legitimate safety 
expectations in Austria, Spain and Norway. [23] The general 
stance is that for the “regulations” to be considered 
“mandatory”, they should be embodied in legal provisions that 
force the producer to manufacture defective products 
(Germany, § 1 (2) no 3 ProdHaftG), constitute structural 
standards of production the cannot be disregarded (Italy, Art. 
118 Consumer Code), or cover the design and/or composition 
of the product (Netherlands, Art. 6:185(1)(d) BW) [23]. 
Second, the case law dealing with the regulatory 
compliance defence is scattered and has until recently been of 
interest mostly to the pharmaceuticals and food industry. Thus, 
in the case of Pollard v Tesco Stores, the English court held 
that a violation of non-binding British standard is not 
conclusive proof of defect [24]. At the same time, in the case of 
Haribo, the Cologne Court of Appeal held that while 
compliance is not an automatic defence, it is a strong evidence 
that the product is not defective [25]. Broadly speaking, while 
compliance with standards does not amount to a regulatory 
compliance defence, it may still act as a presumption that the 
product is compliant [26]. Conversely, non-compliance with 
standards may be interpreted as failing to meet the legitimate 
safety expectations of the public. 
The recent case of Überlingen (Manufacturers) breathed 
new life into the discussion on product liability in the aviation 
industry. In the case, the manufacturers of the collision 
avoidance system, which was installed onboard the two aircraft 
involved in the Überlingen accident, successfully invoked the 
defence because of compliance with mandatory requirements 
imposed by the FAA. The case concerned, inter alia, a 
software update that was available but could not be installed as 
the standard mandated the use of specific algorithms, ie the 
standard did not leave any margin of appreciation to the 
manufacturers. Remarkably, the court applied the Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability of 
1973 which, based on the principal place of business of the 
defendants, determined as applicable the law of the US states 
of Arizona and New Jersey. Nevertheless, authors agree that 
the essence of the regulatory compliance defence in US law is 
in line with its embodiment in the Product Liability Directive 
[8]. 
The decision in Überlingen (Manufacturers) is important in 
at least two directions: (1) it reinforces the applicability of the 
regulatory compliance defence to manufacturers in the heavily 
regulated aviation industry; and (2) brings to the fore the 
discussion of holding standard-setters and regulators liable for 
the choices they make in adopting mandatory standards. 
However, with the advent of autonomous systems, both 
‘victories’ may prove to bring only short-lived comfort for the 
aviation industry. 
First, the regulatory compliance defence would be hardly 
applicable to autonomous systems in the absence of sufficiently 
precise mandatory regulations. As rightly noted in literature, 
the current way of drafting standards can at best ‘codify’ the 
“desire that such systems be reliable” [18]. The certification 
challenges would likely require an entirely new regulatory 
approach. Several ways have been proposed in literature 
[18],[6]: 
a) Employing existing regulatory approaches by 
limitation of the autonomy’s scope either by (1) 
placing a human in the loop or (2) making the 
operational context uniform. 
b) Data-driven multistage approach modelled after 
the approval process for drugs for medical 
devices. 
c) Modification of certification standards to enable a 
more dynamic software structure while keeping 
the existing safety principles. 
d) Development of new verification approaches 
where testing is replaced by formal methods.1 
e) Certification of adaptive functions providing 
advanced capabilities (eg, recovery from aircraft 
upset etc.) by treating the system differently based 
on the time at which it executes (eg, take-off, 
cruise, landing) 
f) Development of a licensing mechanism for 
autonomous systems based on the pilot licencing 
regime which, after demonstration of extensive 
knowledge and skills, leads to certification. 
Nearly all proposed solutions have a bearing on the 
standardisation and certification process. The solutions in (a) 
and (c) seemingly involve minimal modifications to the 
certification process, while those suggested in (b), (e) and (f) 
will require either major changes or a complete shift of the 
certification paradigm. 
In any case, from a legal point of view, if a certification 
authority and/or a standardisation body has issued a mandatory 
regulation which has been complied with by the manufacturer, 
the regulatory compliance defence will be available. This will 
not be the case, however, in the testing-based validations in (b) 
and (f) since their focus would be on the acceptable behaviour 
of a system which could easily be rendered invalid by a single 
change to the system [6]. A potential solution to the problem of 
unanticipated changes is the integration of the approach of 
machine-driven adaptation with human-driven evolution of the 
system [28]. It is questionable whether a mandatory regulation 
for autonomous systems could be precise enough as to 
                                                          
1 Mathematically based techniques for the specification, development, and 
verification of software aspects of digital systems which allow automated and 
exhaustive verification of properties [27]. 
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prescribe specific design choices without leaving any margin of 
appreciation. Furthermore, any testing-based validation, no 
matter how comprehensive, could fail to account for the 
potential of a system learning new behaviour that has not been 
anticipated during the development. Legally speaking, any 
such unanticipated change, to the extent it fails to meet the 
safety expectations of the public, is likely to be treated as a 
defect. In such cases, even though the manufacturer would 
have complied with the mandatory regulation of a certification 
body, their product would still not qualify for the regulatory 
compliance defence because the defective behaviour would not 
be the result of compliance with the mandatory regulation and 
there would be no causal link between the two. This situation 
raises the reasonable question of whether the certification body 
could be held liable for its failure to conduct a comprehensive 
testing-based validation and against what standard its conduct 
would be judged. 
It would be no exaggeration to say that the liability of 
certification and standardisation bodies is enigmatic. As 
reported in literature, the cases of standardisation2 and 
certification bodies3 held accountable for adopted mandatory 
standards are “notoriously rare” [8]. Claims that standard-
setters and regulators are “not regularly accountable through 
legal mechanisms” [8], though, are imprecise. In the case of 
mandatory standards imposed by a state, the state could be 
challenged and the rules for liability of public authorities 
exercising regulatory functions should apply [26]. Admittedly, 
the situation is more complicated when it comes to the liability 
of standardisation and certification bodies at EU level. 
In the EU, the EC has recognised EUROCAE as the 
competent body to cooperate with the European 
Standardisation Organisations (ESOs) in the preparation of 
European Standards (ENs) and Community Specifications 
(CS).4 EASA has equally recognised EUROCAE for its role in 
developing aviation safety technical documents. While these 
standards are considered soft law from a legal perspective, as 
they set minimum performance requirements, their recognition 
by certification bodies such as EASA in mandatory regulations 
essentially transforms them into hard law. In doing so, 
however, EASA does not become accountable for the choices 
made in these standards [8]. 
In principle, as a body of the EU, EASA’s decisions 
concerning airworthiness and environmental certification, pilot 
certification, air operation certification etc. may be appealed 
before a Board of Appeals. Furthermore, actions may be 
brought before the CJEU for the annulment of acts of EASA 
which are legally binding on third parties, for failure to act and 
for damages caused by the agency in the course of its activities. 
The case law on the liability of EU institutions suggests that 
as a general rule liability could be attached only exceptionally, 
                                                          
2 Eg, the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) and the 
European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE). 
3 Eg, FAA and EASA. 
4 Article 4 (1) (a) Regulation (EC) No 552/2004 on the interoperability of the 
European Air Traffic Management network. 
in cases involving a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law 
for the protection of an individual [29]. The court does not 
seem to distinguish between liability for legislative and liability 
for administrative measures, focusing instead on the criterion 
of the degree of discretion enjoyed by the institution [30]. The 
difficulty here is that the intensity of the judicial review is often 
described as “peripheral”, especially in cases where the body in 
question enjoys a wide margin of appreciation [31]. Given the 
margin of appreciation enjoyed by EASA, one can imagine 
establishing a manifest breach would be a cumbersome task. 
It follows that holding the certification body liable for its 
failure to conduct a comprehensive testing-based validation of 
an autonomous adaptive system could be a hard case. While 
strengthening the accountability of standard-setters and 
certification bodies for their design choices could be made by 
legislative amendments, given the maturity of the current 
system, this is unlikely to happen in the near future. Thus, calls 
for considering the potential impact of a certain standard on the 
liability of manufacturers in the drafting process are a welcome 
‘soft’ measure that could improve legal certainty [8]. 
V. AUTONOMY IN THE SKY: UNMANNED AIRCRAFT 
SYSTEMS 
The challenges of liability of manufacturers for ‘defective’ 
autonomous systems in the aviation industry may not be as 
remote as some would think. Considering the fast-growing 
market of unmanned aircraft systems and the ensuing 
development of new commercial services, these challenges 
may turn to be just around the corner. 
In the recently proposed draft regulation laying down rules 
for unmanned aircraft operations in the open and specific 
category, EASA explicitly provides for autonomous operations 
in the specific category.5 ‘Autonomous operation’ is defined as 
an operation during which an unmanned aircraft operates 
without the possibility for remote-pilot intervention in the 
management of the flight. The proposal foresees that aircraft in 
the specific category, which covers the majority of the 
commercially viable operations, are organised around the 
concepts of operational authorisation issued to the operator by 
a national aviation authority based on a risk assessment 
process. Thus, in line with EASA’s operation-centric, 
proportionate, risk- and performance-based approach, in the 
specific category it is the operator that is responsible for 
compliance with the technical requirements laid down in the 
authorisation or the expected standard scenarios. Unlike the 
specific category, in the open category the manufacturer is 
responsible for compliance with the technical requirements 
based on the regime of essential requirements and conformity 
assessment (CE marking).   
As the operator would be the ultimately responsible for the 
technical requirements of the unmanned aircraft in the specific 
category, the liability of the manufacturer could only be 
engaged indirectly. For example, in the acceptable means of 
                                                          
5 Article 2 (1) (d) and UAS.SPEC.10 EASA Notice of Proposed Amendment 
2017-05 (A). 
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compliance6 listed in an annex to the proposal, in the case of 
autonomous operations, the operator should ensure that the 
UAS complies with the instructions provided by the 
manufacturer. These instructions would certainly play a role in 
determining the public’s safety expectations. Furthermore, any 
such ‘instructions’ may, in their own right, be treated as 
products for the purposes of product liability.7 In this case, 
provided the acceptable means for compliance and the 
guidance material are non-binding, the regulatory compliance 
defence cannot be invoked. Similarly, manufacturers of 
software and software frameworks could be held liable for 
defects in the provided software and the accompanying 
instructions. In light of the issues with the definition of defect 
and the liability for potential defects, discussed in section III 
above, software companies engaged in the development of 
software frameworks or applications may face challenging 
legal uncertainty. 
In addition to the open and specific categories, EASA 
foresees a third category of UAS operations (ie the certified 
category) which is not subject to regulation by the proposal. 
This category will require certification of the aircraft and 
licencing of the flight crew. Examples of such operations 
include, inter alia, large or complex UAS operations over 
assemblies of people, large or complex UAS operating beyond 
visual line of sight in high-density airspace, UAS used for 
transportation of people etc. Thus, potentially, any large-scale 
UAS operation would fall within the certified category. While 
EASA is planning to propose first rules for the certified 
category in the beginning of 20188, it is apparent that the 
regime will be based largely on the model of manned aviation. 
Conversely, this means that the challenges of the existing 
product liability regime, particularly with respect to the 
regulatory compliance defence, will also persist in the certified 
category. 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The digitalisation and increasing autonomy of aviation 
systems disrupts the traditionally conservative domain of 
aviation safety and puts to the test the limits of existing product 
liability rules and certification mechanisms. 
While there are no doubts that the Product Liability 
Directive applies to the aviation domain, reasonable concerns 
have been raised as to whether its ‘strong-arm’ power can 
reach the major aviation technology producers which are 
currently mostly US-based.9 The stated aim of competitiveness 
                                                          
6 Article 2 (1) (a) of the proposal provides that acceptable means of 
compliance are non-binding standards which may be used to demonstrate 
compliance. 
7 The question of whether information as such falls within the ambit of the 
Product Liability Directive is subject to discussion in literature. Strong 
arguments as to why information, especially when ‘materialised’ on a tangible 
medium, should be treated as a product could be found in [23]. 
8 Based on the presentation of Yves Morrier of EASA during the UAS Open 
and Specific Category Workshop hosted by EASA in Cologne on 5th July 
2017. 
9 This was also the case with Honeywell and ACSS in Überlingen 
(Manufacturers). 
and global leadership of the EU in the development of a “drone 
ecosystem” [32] is echoed in the regulatory actions of EASA. 
Furthermore, the rapidly growing number of companies and 
research organisations from the EU engaged in development of 
software for unmanned aircraft systems is a strong indicator of 
the EU’s innovative potential in developing autonomous 
systems for the aviation sector. This delicate balance, however, 
could be easily distorted by legal uncertainty induced by the 
fact that the existing product liability regime is arguably unfit 
for such purposes. 
The analysis in the previous sections demonstrates that 
autonomous systems’ learning and adaptive capabilities are a 
significant challenge for the product liability regime. Most of 
these issues could only be resolved with legislative 
intervention. To this effect, the following amendments could be 
suggested: 
 Software should be included explicitly as a 
product and the definition should extend to cover 
both non-embedded software and ‘software as a 
service’. 
This measure is critical for reinforcing the deterrent role of 
product liability, particularly for entrants that are new in the 
aviation industry, such as young companies and research 
organisations developing software for unmanned aircraft 
systems. 
 Objective standard for measuring the “abnormal 
potential for damage” must be crafted to restrain 
the otherwise broad scope of the liability for 
potential defects and to prevent innovation from 
stifling. 
In the absence of an objective standard against which the 
criterion of “abnormal potential for damage” could be 
measured, the liability for potential defects introduced with 
Boston Scientific could have serious repercussions for 
producers engaged in autonomous systems development. The 
European legislator should also consider the legal nature of the 
liability engaged in these cases since the criterion of knowledge 
on the part of the manufacturer adds a negligence twist to the 
otherwise strict liability based regime. Furthermore, the 
regulatory impact of liability based on potential defects and 
potential damages should be carefully evaluated as it could 
have the negative effect of discouraging manufacturers to share 
information on potential risks, especially when the risks are 
considered to be minor, out of fear of claims. In the domain of 
aviation, this could have catastrophic consequences. 
 The state of the art defence must be reassessed in 
light of the very high standard for exoneration in 
the case of autonomous systems. 
The learning and adaptation feedback loops in an 
autonomous system can lead to changes in its behaviour that 
may create new risks which, by their nature, cannot be known 
or foreseen. Thus, in light of the liability for potential defects, 
in order to rely on the state of the art defence, a manufacturer 
must prove he could not have known about the risk of product 
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malfunctioning in the future, even with the most advanced 
level of scientific and technical knowledge. Provided the 
leading role of the criterion of ‘safety expectations of the 
public’ in determining whether a product is defective, the 
defence may be rendered effectively useless to manufacturers 
of autonomous systems. 
 The regulatory compliance defence’s role must be 
reassessed in light of the certification challenges 
experienced by certification authorities regarding 
autonomous systems 
If manufacturers cannot rely on the regulatory compliance 
defence for autonomous systems certified for their ‘proper’ 
behaviour on the basis of testing-based validation, then the 
accountability of certification bodies and standard-setters for 
their design choices and verification and validation 
mechanisms should be made more explicit. 
The highly regulated environment and the paramount 
importance of safety in aviation have had impact on the 
liability for defective products which reveals certain specifics 
compared to other domains. This has led some authors to call 
for the adoption of a special (possibly international) legal 
instrument for product liability in aviation [8]. However, given 
the state of international affairs and the difficulty in promoting 
a new legal instrument in a field as conservative as aviation, 
this proposal is unlikely to see the light of day anytime soon. 
Even if no international product liability regime for aviation 
could be agreed in the near future, the aviation industry in the 
EU has a unique opportunity to participate in the drafting of the 
new rules of product liability in the EU and to state in a loud 
voice its concerns and propose solutions to issues which 
otherwise threaten to suffocate its innovation potential. 
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